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Abstract—A major hurdle of formal adoption of OAuth protocol 
for enterprise applications is performance. Enterprise 
applications (e.g. SAP, SharePoint, Exchange Server, etc.) 
require a mechanism to predict and manage performance 
expectations. As these applications become more and more 
ubiquitous in the Cloud, the scale and performance expectations 
become an important factor impacting architectural decisions for 
security protocol adoption.  This paper proposes an optimization 
to OAuth 2.0 for enterprise adoption. This optimization is 
achieved by introducing provisioning steps to pre-establish trust 
amongst enterprise applications’ Resource Servers, its associated 
Authorization Server and the clients interested in access to 
protected resources.  In this model, trust is provisioned and 
synchronized as a pre-requisite step to authentication and 
authorization amongst all communicating entities in OAuth 
protocol, namely, the client requesting a protected resource, the 
resource server, and the authorization server.    For a case study, 
we analyze SAP authenticating with SharePoint using our 
optimization versus existing OAuth protocol. We believe such 
optimization will further facilitate the adoption of OAuth in the 
enterprise where scale and performance are critical factors. 
Keywords-OAuth; Authentication and Authorization; Cloud 
Performance; Access Delegation; Authorization Servers 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
OAuth is a claim-based security protocol that enables users 
to grant third-party access to their protected resources without 
sharing their passwords. OAuth implements this by using a 
data structure, called token, that decouples the access right 
from the client login credentials [5].  Clients request tokens 
from authorization server and present the token to the service 
provide.  OAuth 1.0 [1] was published in December 2007 and 
quickly became the industry standard for web-based access 
delegation.  However, OAuth 1.0 faced lots of challenges to 
make it into the enterprise domain mainly due to the lack of 
performance optimization capabilities currently on offer by the 
protocol.  Microsoft, Google, and other large organizations [3] 
proposed OAuth WRAP (Web Resource Authorization 
Profiles) to solve the performance challenges and facilitate 
adoption by the enterprise.  One of the main optimizations is 
the introduction of an independent Authorization Server.  
OAuth adopted the WRAP recommendation into OAuth 2.0.  
However, adoption has not yet been proven in enterprise 
deployments (e.g. Microsoft Exchange Server, Lync Server, 
Oracle, SharePoint, SAP, etc.).   In this work, we introduce an 
optimization to OAuth 2.0 where the Authorization Server is 
provisioned with explicit authorization table so that access 
grants are rejected at the Authorization Server before getting to 
the protected resource.  This reduces the amount of processing 
some popular protected resources would have to do and 
alleviates the risk of potential threats such as Denial-of-Service 
(DoS) attacks and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks. In addition, 
by extending the parameters of OAuth authorization request, 
the calling client can reduce the number of calls it makes to the 
authorization server.  In the model we developed in this paper, 
a client makes a single trip to the authorization server to serve 
all its users.  In the case study presented, we show how a SAP 
server would only need to make a single acquisition of a token 
to server all it’s logged in users with documents available in 
SharePoint. 
In the next section, we discuss the drivers behind the 
introduction of OAuth2.0 and present its architecture. In 
section 3, we argue the modifications suggested to OAuth 2.0 
in order to facilitate enterprise adoption of the protocol through 
a case study. Finally, section 4 rounds off the paper with a 
conclusion and a preview of planned future work. 
II. INTRODUCTION TO OAUTH 2.0 
Although OAuth 2.0 is a new protocol, it still retains the 
overall architecture and approach established by the previous 
versions. As large providers started using OAuth 1.0, the 
community realized that the protocol does not scale well. It 
required state management across different steps; temporary 
credentials management; and provided no isolation of the 
Authorization server from the protected resource server itself. 
In addition, OAuth 1.0 required that the protected resource 
servers’ endpoints have access to the client credentials in order 
to validate the request. This broke the typical architecture of 
most large providers in which a centralized authorization server 
is used for issuing credentials, and a separate server is used for 
API calls. OAuth 1.0 required the use of both sets of 
credentials: the client credentials and the token credentials, 
which made the separation very hard [2] 
As the deployment of Cloud hosted enterprise software 
evolves (such as Exchange Online, SharePoint Online, and 
SAP), there is a growing trend for these applications to 
integration with each other.  In addition, a variety of market 
place applications do desire to integrate with these enterprise 
resources through an API over HTTP or other protocols.  Often 
these resources require authorization for access to such 
Protected Resources.  The systems that are trusted to make 
authorization decisions may be independent from the Protected 
Resources Servers for scalability and security reasons.  The 
OAuth Web Resource   Authorization Profiles (OAuth WRAP) 
enable a Protected Resource to delegate the authorization to 
access a Protected Resource to one or more trusted authorities.  
Clients that wish to access a Protected Resource first obtain 
authorization from a trusted authority (Authorization Server).  
Different credentials and profiles can be used to obtain this 
authorization, but once authorized, the Client is provided with 
an Access Token and possibly a Refresh Token to obtain new 
Access Tokens.  The Authorization Server typically includes 
authorization information in the Access Token and digitally 
signs the Access Token.  The Protected Resource Server can 
verify that an Access Token received from a Client was issued 
by a trusted Authorization Server and is valid.  The Protected 
Resource Server can then examine the contents of the Access 
Token to determine the authorization that has been granted to 
the Client. 
Figure 1 below shows the architecture for OAuth 2.0 with 
an independent Authorization Server. 
The abstract flow illustrated in Figure 1 describes the 
interaction between the four roles and includes the following 
steps: 
1. The client requests authorization from the resource 
owner.  
2. The resource owner redirects the request to 
authorization serve 
3. The client requests authorization grant from the 
authorization server by presenting the client 
credentials 
4. The authorization server validates the client 
credentials and the authorization grant, and if valid 
issues an access token 
5. The client requests the protected resource from the 
resource server and authenticates by presenting the 
access token 
6. The resource server validates the access token, and 
if valid, serves the request. 
III. ENTERPRISE INTEGRATION 
It is often required for servers to integrate with each other 
and exchange protected data.  An example of this is SharePoint 
Online integration with SAP.  A third party may want to 
develop an application to login into SAP and save completed 
financial reports in SharePoint for sharing with colleagues or 
managers, for example.  Since these financial reports are 
protected resource with high business impact, it may not want 
to hand its protected data to any application with a valid token.  
Also since our example protected resource servers SharePoint 
and SAP can host millions of users in the Cloud in a Shared 
Tenancy [5] model, request for access with valid tokens can 
easily burden the server.   
In our proposal, shown in Figure 2 below, we are adding a 
provisioning step in which a pre-established trust between the 
Client and the Resource Server is established.  This step can 
reduce many of the unwanted requests to the Resource Server. 
Also, during this step the client is given information on where 
to go to acquire a token, in other words, the address of the 
Authorization Server. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  OAuth 2.0 Protocol Flow 
 
 Figure 2. OAuth 2.0 Modified Architecture 
 
The abstract flow illustrated in Figure 2 above describes the 
OAuth 2.0 modified interaction between the different roles and 
includes the following steps: 
A. Provisioning step:  clients interested in acquiring 
protected resources from resource server are 
provisioned (in a delegation table, for example).  
The address of the authorization server is 
provided, for example as: https://authserver.com 
B. Resource Server synchronizes trusted client with 
Authorization Server so that it only issues tokens 
to provisioned clients 
 
When a client wants to access a resource from Resource 
Server: 
1. The client requests authorization grant from the 
authorization server by presenting the client 
credentials 
2. The authorization server validates the client 
credentials and the authorization grant. It also 
validates that the client is a trusted entity by 
Resource Server and issues an access token 
3. The client requests the protected resource from the 
resource server and authenticates by presenting the 
access token 
4. The resource server validates the access token, and 
if valid, serves the request. 
It is important to note that during provisioning, the client 
may be given the rights to act on behalf of any user.  In this 
case, the client make a request to acquire a token (step 1 above) 
only once during the lifetime of the token.  In our experiment, 
when we setup the token lifetime for 24hours, the client was 
making a round trip to the authorization server once a day.  
This is a significant optimization over what the current OAuth 
2.0 model offers. 
IV. CASE STUDY 
In our case study, we simulate the use of two enterprise 
applications, namely SharePoint Online and SAP that are 
interested in sharing protected resources on behalf of their 
users.  For the purpose of this case study, SAP and SharePoint 
are also provisioned to trust each other and can act on behalf of 
any user they trust.  Therefore, SharePoint is provisioned to 
trust SAP and SAP is provisioned to trust SharePoint.  The 
Authorization Server is synchronized so it only issues tokens to 
trusted clients such as SAP and SharePoint.  If any client 
requests a token with non-established trust, the Authorization 
server will deny access. 
In order to simulate this, we built a Resource Server (RS1) 
and set up an Authorization Table as shown in Table 1 below.  
This table is synchronized on the Authorization Server (Table 
2) as well as the client (Table 3).  Resource Server can only 
issue tokens to SharePoint and for SAP.  The Resource Server 
can only accept tokens issued by Authorization Server (AS1) 
scoped to SharePoint.   
TABLE I.  RESOURCE SERVER (SHAREPOINT) TABLE 
Authorized Client Credentials 
SAP SAP Credentials /public key 
Client2 Client2 credentials/public key 
  
  
 
 
 TABLE II.  AUTHORIZATION SERVER (AS1) TABLE 
Client AppliesTo Credentials 
SAP All users SAP Credentials/public key 
SharePoint All users SharePoint Credentials/public key 
   
   
   
 
TABLE III.  CLIENT TABLE (SAP) 
Resource Server Authorization Server 
SharePoint https://AS1  
Resource Server 2 https://AS2 
  
  
 
During trust establishment (Step A in Figure 2 above), the 
Resource Server (SharePoint) sets Table1.  It synchronizes it 
with its Authorization Server.  In return, the Authorization 
Server will only issue tokens to clients in the table after 
validating their credentials.  If, for example, a client C1 comes 
with a request, it will not be granted a token since it does not 
have an entry in the table. Such optimization reduces the 
number of unwanted calls to resource servers such as 
SharePoint or SAP, since they will be rejected at the 
authorization server. During the provisioning process with the 
client, the Resource Server provides the address of its 
Authorization Server so that the client goes there to acquire a 
token. These clients do not need to ping the resource server and 
be redirected to the authorization server as in the original 
OAuth 2.0 protocol.  This also helps in reducing potential DoS 
or DDoS threats since the resource server does not need to 
compute every request and redirect it.  Instead it will be 
rejecting the unwanted requests due to lack of access token 
within the request itself.  In our case study, both SAP and 
SharePoint simulated servers shared the same Authorization 
Server and exchanged the location “https://AS1”, in this 
example.  https://AS1 simulates the location of the 
authorization server so that the client knows where to go to 
obtain the authorization token.  In the original OAuth protocol, 
the client needs to hit the resource server first and gets 
redirected to the authorization server.  With our proposed 
optimization, due to the provisioning step, the client can go 
directly to the authorization server.    
A second optimization we have designed is the introduction 
of additional parameter to the Token itself.  This parameter is 
called AppliesTo parameter.  When SAP requests a Token 
from AS1, it will be receiving a token with AppliesTo 
parameter = ‘All users’ (if during trust provisioning such client 
is allowed to act on behalf of all users).  SAP (client in this 
case), therefore, does not have to request a token for every 
additional request against SharePoint.  SAP in this case, can 
cache the token and make a request against SharePoint for 
additional claims throughout the lifetime of the token. In our 
case study, SAP was required to acquire a single token once 
every 24 hours since we setup the lifetime of the token to 24 
hours.  It is important to note that OAuth protocol allows the 
authorization server to set the token lifetime.  For our case 
study we used 24 hours.  This can be configured based on the 
security needs of the resource server. 
Table 4 below shows our modified protocol access token 
parameter list.  
TABLE IV.  THE MODIFIED PROTOCOL ACCESS TOKEN PARAMETERS 
 Field Value Description 
Claims in the 
token 
Response_type Code Request parameter is used 
to identity which grant type 
the client is requesting 
Client_id SAP The name of the principal 
that issued the token 
Scope SharePoint The scope of the access 
request expressed 
Signature Public key stamp Client credential 
Response 
parameters 
ExpiresIn … The lifetime of the token 
Authorization_type Code The authorization code that 
was used to generate the 
access token 
AppliesTo All users A parameter to indicate that 
client is interested in acting 
on behalf of all users 
 
V. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
As a consumer centric authentication protocol, OAuth is 
light-weight, secure, and simple identity management protocol. 
In this paper we have shown an optimization that can 
significantly reduce number of authentication requests without 
jeopardizing security requirements. Our optimization also 
reduces unwanted authentication claims and can potentially 
reduce potential DoS and DDoS threats.  To better leverage 
OAuth 2.0 in the enterprise, we proposed two optimizations.  
The first optimization is requiring a pre-established trust 
provisioning step.  In this step, we synchronized an 
authorization table between the client, the Resource Server, and 
the Authorization Server.  The second optimization is 
introducing AppliesTo parameter so that highly trusted clients 
can authenticate on behalf of users.  
In future work, we plan to introduce additional optimization 
for Cloud based enterprise servers hosted in a multi-tenancy 
environment.  In this optimization, we plan to develop and 
provision a shared Authorization Server than can serve access 
tokens to each tenant in a secured way. 
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